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With the Polish situation more settled than 
it has been for some months, the world awaits 
the outcome of the crucial Congress of the 
Polish United Workers Party (Poland's 
Communist Party), due in mid-July. This 
congress will determine whether the months- 
old movement towards a socialist democracy 
will speed up, with the party's approval, or 
whether the party will try to reverse the 
process, or at least "hold the line" at the 
current position.
All the signs are that most of the party's 
rank and file want the process of socialist 
renewal to speed up and broaden its aims.
If the congress endorses a program of 
renewal and reforms, the clash between the 
Solidarity trade union and the party will 
diminish considerably, and there will be every 
possibility for a productive party/union 
alliance to creatively tackle Poland's deep 
economic, social and political problems.
Already the possibilities of such a 
partnership are very real. The party 
leadership has recently conceded major 
demands, including that of farmers for a 
R ural S o lid a rity , and the S o lidarity  
leadership is recognising the need for realistic 
economic measures, even possible increases in 
food prices.
The Soviet leadership has not welcomed 
the process taking place in Poland. In fact, 
they have made plain their wish to see it 
"reversed". The propaganda barrage from 
Moscow, Prague and East Berlin has recalled 
only too vividly the campaign against the 
Czechoslovak party before the 1968 invasion.
It would be nice to be able to rule out a 
Czech-style intervention in Poland's affairs. 
Certainly the threat of one has receded in the 
past few weeks. However, given the obvious 
unhappiness of the Soviet leaders and others 
in Eastern Europe, the "track record"suggests 
caution in ruling it out altogether.
But the situation is somewhat different 
today from what it was in 1968. There is far 
greater active working class participation in
Poland's reforms. If the Soviet Union 
intervened in Poland, it would have to count 
on determined and prolonged resistance by 
the Polish workers and people — and possibly 
the army.
And while Czechoslovakia in 1968 was a 
very big mouthful to swallow, taking several 
years to fully digest, Poland in 1981 would be 
virtually indigestible. The Soviet Union 
would be taking over Poland's huge foreign 
debts and other big economic problems — a 
massive burden on top of its own problems of 
economic development and foreign-aid 
commitments elsewhere.
However, in the minds of at least some 
Soviet leaders, there must be powerful 
reasons for intervening against the "Polish 
disease". To all-too-many Soviet leaders, the 
Polish events raise a spectre of change 
throughout Eastern Europe, including in the 
USSR, in directions which they do not like. 
Rightly or wrongly, such people see their own 
positions, and the social values they hold 
dear, deeply threatened.
Which course will finally be adopted 
remains to be seen. It is to be hoped that 
sanity, and socialist principles, will prevail 
and that at least some elements in the Soviet 
leadership will learn from, rather than fear, 
the Polish events. Should that heppen, the 
positive influence of Poland on the world­
wide prospects for socialism, and on 
international affairs generally, will be great.
Intervention, on the other hand, would do 
tremendous damage to the world socialist 
movement, perhaps even worse than the 1968 
Czech intervention, and would open up a very 
bleak period in the world situation.
Poland, therefore, has an importance far 
beyond its own borders. Indeed, the Polish 
experiment may well be one of crucial 
importance to the future of humankind.
— B.A., May 20, 1981.
